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Consumer Welfare, Total Welfare and Economic Freedom – On 
the Normative Foundations of Competition Policy∗ 
by 
Viktor J. Vanberg 
University of Freiburg 
Walter Eucken Institut, Freiburg 
 
1. Introduction 
The debate about the ‘more economic approach’ and its role in the so-called ‘modernization 
of European competition law’1 centers around two principal issues. One issue concerns the 
normative foundations of competition policy, the question of what should be considered its 
proper goal. The controversy here is essentially about whether competition policy should seek 
to advance consumer welfare or total welfare, or ought to aim, instead, at protecting 
‘Wettbewerbsfreiheit’ or the ‘freedom to compete,’ a goal that has been notably stressed in 
the German ordo-liberal tradition. The other issue is about how economics as an empirical 
science can help to improve the effectiveness of competition policy in achieving its presumed 
goal. The controversy here is about whether competition policy should adopt an “effects-
based approach” that takes account of the specific effects in each particular case as opposed to 
the conventional “form-based approach” that works with general prohibitions of certain types 
or forms of business practices (Schmidtchen 2007a: 96ff.).2 
 In the ongoing debate on the merits and demerits of the ‘modernization of European 
competition law’ the two issues are usually not explicitly separated from each other, and they 
are, to be sure, interdependent. They are, however, analytically distinct and the failure to 
carefully distinguish between them is a major source of ambiguities in the arguments that 
have been exchanged between critics and advocates of the ‘more economic approach.’ The 
present paper seeks to clarify some of these ambiguities by approaching the debate from the 
perspective of constitutional economics, a perspective that has two principal ingredients. This 
is, on the one hand, its systematic distinction between the constitutional and the sub-
                                                 
∗ Prepared for presentation at the conference on “Foundations and Limitations of an Economic Approach to 
Competition Law”, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Munich, March 
12-13, 2009. 
1 Röller (2005: 37), the Chief Competition Economist of the European Commission from 2003 to 2006, speaks 
of  the “strengthening and modernization of the economic foundations” of competition policy. 
2 Schmidtchen (2007b: 1): “A more economic approach to the application of competition law means that the 
assessment of each specific case will not be undertaken on the basis of the form or the intrinsic nature of a 
particular practice (form-based approach) but rather will be based on the assessment of its anti- and pro-
competitive effects (effects-based approach).” – According to Schmidtchen (2007a: 96) the ‘effects-based 
approach’ is at the heart (“das Herzstück”) of the ‘more economic approach.’ 
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constitutional level of choice, i.e. the distinction between choices within rules and choices 
among rules. And this is, on the other hand, its contractarian outlook, i.e. the premise that 
mutual benefit is the criterion against which the ‘efficiency’ or ‘goodness’ of social 
transactions or arrangements should be judged, and that voluntary agreement among the 
individuals involved is the ultimate test for such mutual benefit.3 
 The paper will focus primarily on the issue mentioned first, namely the normative 
foundations of competition policy. My main purpose is to show that constitutional economics 
can answer the question of what goal competition policy ought to pursue in ways that are 
more in line with the legitimizing principles of a democratic society than the answer provided 
by its paradigmatic counterpart, conventional welfare economics. In its later part the paper 
will also address the issue of the ‘effects-based’ versus ‘form-based’ approach. 
 
2. Science and Politics: Economics as Applied Science 
As empirical science economics is supposed to make factual statements, judgments about 
what is. The question of which goals competition policy should pursue is about what ought to 
be, and to answer it requires a value judgment. This raises the issue of what economics can 
contribute to a discussion on the proper goal of competition policy without transgressing the 
limits of its domain as empirical science. In dealing with this issue the distinction, familiar to 
philosophers, between two kinds of ought-statements, namely between categorical and 
hypothetical imperatives, can help to avoid unnecessary confusion.  
 Imperatives or should-statements are always addressed to someone who is called upon 
to do something, as in the case of prescriptions, or to refrain from doing something, as in the 
case of proscriptions. Categorical and hypothetical imperatives differ in terms of the grounds 
on which addressees are asked to comply. Categorical imperatives are ought-statements for 
which categorical or unconditional authority is claimed in the sense that compliance is 
demanded no matter what the addressees might prefer to do. By contrast, hypothetical 
imperatives are ought-statements for which only hypothetical or conditional authority is 
claimed in the sense that they tell their addressees what they should do if they wish to achieve 
certain goals or solve certain problems. By contrast to the unconditional demands of 
categorical imperatives, hypothetical imperatives provide only prudential advice for what are 
suitable means to achieve certain purposes. They inform addressees about how they can 
pursue their interests more effectively. 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed discussion of the constitutional economics perspective and for further references see 
Vanberg 2005.  
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 The important difference between the two kinds of ought-statements is that 
hypothetical imperatives can be rationally examined in ways that categorical imperatives 
cannot. Whether addressees should in fact do what a hypothetical imperative or conditional 
ought-statements tells them to do depends on, firstly, whether they are actually interested in 
achieving a presumed purpose, whether, secondly, the prescribed action is indeed a suitable 
instrument for achieving the purpose, and, thirdly, whether or not some preferable alternative 
means exist for achieving the purpose. Categorical imperatives do not expose themselves to 
such critical scrutiny. They cannot be objected to in terms of the addressee’s opposing 
interests and they cannot be criticized on instrumental grounds because they claim an 
authority that is neither contingent on the addressee’s interests nor contingent on their 
suitability to achieve stated purposes. 
 Empirical sciences do not have arguments in their legitimate repertoire that allow them 
to issue categorical imperatives, but they surely can support hypothetical imperatives. In fact, 
issuing hypothetical imperatives is the ordinary business of any applied science, such as 
engineering or medical science. This applies no less to economics. In its application to matters 
of competition policy – or of other areas of politics – economics can, like other applied 
sciences, issue hypothetical imperatives without transgressing the limits of its domain as an 
empirical science. And this is how, based on its theoretical and empirical insights into the 
working properties of alternative rules, constitutional economics can provide advise for how 
groups of individuals may improve the socio-economic-political games they are engaged in 
by adopting better ‘rules of the game.’ 
 Welfare economics has traditionally served as the applied branch of economics that 
seeks to translate its insights into how the ‘economic world’ works into policy advice. As an 
offspring of utilitarianism welfare economics has sought to serve this function by presuming 
that to promote or, ideally, to maximize ‘social welfare’ – as measured by an appropriately 
specified social welfare function – is the unquestionable and self-evident goal that politics 
ought to pursue. The utilitarian approach of welfare economics has long been the subject of 
extensive discussions that have mostly focused on technical issues, in particular the 
measurability and inter-subjective comparability of the utilities that the social welfare 
function is supposed to aggregate, issues that the Paretian and New Welfare Economics have 
sought to answer. In the present context my interest is not so much in these issues but rather in 
conceptual difficulties the social welfare construction faces even if a cardinal measurement of 
utilities and their inter-subjective comparability were possible. These difficulties become 
apparent when the question is asked to whom welfare economists mean to address their 
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advice, and what kinds of arguments they can offer to the intended addressees for why they 
should heed the advice.  
 If welfare economics is, as we may suppose, not meant to issue categorical imperatives 
its statements on what economic policy ought to do must be interpreted as hypothetical 
imperatives. This means, however, its statements must have addressees whom they tell what, 
in light of the knowledge that economics can provide, they should prudently do if they wish to 
achieve certain purposes. It is exactly in regard to the questions of whom it means to speak to, 
and in what sense the advice it offers appeals to the addressees’ interests, that conventional 
welfare economics remains fundamentally ambiguous. Welfare economists are typically not 
very explicit about whom, exactly, they mean to address with their advice, nor do they, as a 
rule, provide any arguments for why their policy recommendations can be expected to serve 
purposes that the addressee might pursue. It is this very fact that has prompted the ironic 
critique of public choice theorists that welfare economists seem to address their advice to 
some ‘imaginary benevolent dictator’ (Buchanan 1999: 456), a charge to which I shall return 
in the next section. 
 By contrast to welfare economics, constitutional economics leaves no doubt about the 
intended addressees of its advice or about the nature of the arguments by which it supports its 
recommendations. According to its contractarian outlook, constitutional economics regards 
the individual members or constituents of groups that are to arrange their common affairs, 
such as the citizens of a polity, as the sovereigns with whom the ultimate decision making 
authority resides – ‘ultimate’ because they may have delegated such decision making 
authority to agents who are supposed to act on their behalf – and who are, accordingly, the 
ultimate addressees of advice in constitutional matters, even if their agents or representatives 
may be the proximate addressees. The principal task of constitutional economics as applied 
science is to use its insights into the working properties of alternative rules in order to provide 
advice about how the citizens of polities – or the members-constituents of other kinds of 
groups – can realize mutual benefits by adopting rules that serve their common interests 
Vanberg 2005: 26ff.). This concept of policy advice fits, as I shall argue in the next section, 
very well with the constitutional principles of democratic politics. 
 
3. Policy Advice in a Democratic Society 
From a contractarian constitutionalist perspective a democratic polity can be described as a 
citizen co-operative or, in the words of John Rawls (1971: 84), as “a cooperative venture for 
mutual advantage.” Co-operatives in the standard sense of the term are member-owned 
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enterprises that serve to generate common benefits for their members. It is the central message 
of James M. Buchanan’s founding contribution to constitutional economics that collective 
arrangements, private and public, can be examined from a generalized exchange paradigm.4 In 
analogy to simple bilateral exchanges that standard market economics focuses on, collective 
cooperative enterprises can, so Buchanan argues, be looked at as multi-lateral exchange 
arrangements to which the contracting parties promise to contribute their share on the 
condition that all others contribute their share as well, and from which all participants expect 
net benefits. 
 The principal problem that individuals face in forming a cooperative enterprise is how 
to organize its operation so as to enhance the prospects for mutual gains and to reduce the 
risks of damages to their interests. This problem arises in particular where, as is the rule in 
groups beyond a minimal size, for reasons of practicability decision making authority must be 
delegated to agents who manage the day to day affairs of the enterprise on behalf of its 
members-principals. To provide advice to cooperative enterprises therefore means, to inform 
its members about ways and means for how, in light of the noted problem, they can protect 
and advance their common interests. It means, in particular, to inform about organizational 
devices that can help to solve the principal-agent problem and about potential enterprise 
activities that promise to create mutual benefits. 
 Democratic polities as citizen cooperatives differ, of course, in important regards from 
‘ordinary’ private cooperative enterprises that individuals form within an existing legal-
institutional order, an order that defines and secures their respective rights and enforces 
contracts that they conclude among themselves. Notwithstanding their differences, the 
analogy to private co-operatives is, however, useful for highlighting attributes of democratic 
polities as ‘cooperative ventures for mutual advantage’ that are of relevance in the present 
context. Just as the members of private co-operatives are the owners and ultimate sovereigns 
with whom the authority to decide on common affairs resides and who, accordingly, are the 
ultimate addressee for advice on how the enterprise may be operated to their common benefit, 
so the citizens of democratic polities are the ultimate sovereigns from whom all decision 
making authority originates and who, accordingly, are the ultimate addressees for policy 
advice that informs about opportunities for mutual improvement. 
 Advice to democratic polities as citizen co-operatives must, just as advice to ordinary 
private co-operatives, be supported by arguments that are capable of convincing the respective 
                                                 
4 Buchanan (1991: 121f.): “Contractarianism … can be interpreted as little more than an extension of the 
paradigm of free exchange to the broader setting. … By shifting ‘voluntary exchange’ upward to the 
constitutional level of choices among rules, the consensual or general agreement test may be applied.” 
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members-sovereigns that following the advice serves their common interests and, by 
implication, the interests of each single member. Constitutional economics explicitly submits 
its arguments to such constraint. Its ambition as applied science is to identify opportunities for 
advancing members’ common constitutional interests. In other words, it explores 
opportunities for constitutional choices, or changes in the rules of the game, that promise 
benefits for all persons involved. As noted before, where decision making authority is 
delegated to a representative body a distinction must be made between the ultimate addressees 
of such policy advice, the citizens-principals, and the proximate addressees, the 
representatives or agents who manage the public affairs on the citizens’ behalf. In the limiting 
case of a political order that perfectly aligns agents’ interests and principals’ interests there is 
no difference between advising citizens and advising political agents. The hypothetical 
imperatives that inform citizens about opportunities for mutual improvement are, in this 
limiting case, identical with hypothetical imperatives that help political agents to successfully 
pursue their own aims. The less effective the institutions of politics are in aligning the 
common interests of citizens and the interests of political agents the more the advice that 
politicians are interested in for their purposes may diverge from advice that helps citizens to 
realize mutual advantages.5 
 The diagnosis that, as a matter of fact, the institutions of politics are typically more or 
less deficient in the noted sense is behind the above quoted charge of public choice theorists 
that welfare economists, with their advice about welfare improving policies, seem to speak to 
an ‘imaginary benevolent despot.’ The charge is that welfare economists ignore the factual 
dynamics of real world politics in which the policies that they recommend as ‘welfare 
improving’ need not at all be the kind of policies that help politicians to be successful in the 
competition they are involved in. In other words, public choice theorists accuse welfare 
economists of producing policy recommendations that a ‘benevolent despot’ may be expected 
to listen to, but that fall on deaf ears with real world politicians who are interested in advice 
for how they can more successfully pursue their own ambitions. 
 The public choice critique asserts that real world politicians cannot be expected to be 
receptive addressees of the advice that welfare economists offer. This leaves open the 
question of whether not, alternatively, the ultimate democratic sovereigns, the citizens, may 
                                                 
5 For a detailed discussion of this issue see S. Cassel 2001. – For practical purposes advise about measures that 
advance citizens’ common interests will often be directed at political agents as proximate addressees. This serves 
to inform them what they should to if they wish to live up to their official mandate, namely to operate the polity 
as a ‘cooperative venture to the mutual advantage of its citizens.’ Even if such advice may not directly appeal to 
the agents’ interest in learning about ways to advance their own purposes, it can serve as a constraint that helps 
to better align their interests with those of the citizens whom they are supposed to serve.  
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be the proper addressees who can learn from welfare economics about policies that advance 
their common interests. In order to qualify as such advice the policy proposals that welfare 
economists produce would have to be supported by arguments that are capable of convincing 
citizens that they can expect mutual advantages from the proposed measures. This would be 
the case if welfare economist would argue in terms of benefits that accrue to all citizens of the 
respective polity. This is, however, not how welfare economists typically phrase their advice. 
They argue in terms of aggregate welfare effects rather than in terms of common benefits that 
all members of the respective polity may expect to share. Citizens have, however, little reason 
to welcome policies that are predicted to improve an aggregate social welfare measure as long 
as they are not told how they can expect to benefit, individually and jointly (Vanberg 2005: 
32ff.). 
 Welfare economists, this is the upshot of the above arguments, appear to produce 
advice for which a receptive addressee is difficult to identify. Their policy proposals appeal 
neither directly to purposes that political agents may be presumed to pursue, nor do they 
appeal to the interests of citizens in projects of mutual advantage. One is tempted to conclude 
that welfare economists speak to each other rather than to any interested addressee in real 
world politics. 
 
4. Private Autonomy and Market Competition 
Our concern in this paper is with the question of what kind of competence economists can 
legitimately claim in advising competition policy. Before addressing this question within the 
specific context that is of interest here, namely the discussion on a ‘modernization’ of EU 
competition policy, it is useful to recall some basic insights on the nature of market 
competition. 
 Competition in the most general sense of the word is an inescapable fate in a world of 
scarcity in which the means available to satisfy human wants fall notoriously short of these 
wants because what humans desire always moves ahead of the means at their disposal, no 
matter how successful they are in expanding them. As Armen Alchian has succinctly put it, in 
a world of scarcity where conflicts of interest among advantage seeking individuals are 
omnipresent we do not have the option to live without competition, we can only choose 
between alternative ways in which competition is carried out.6 A feudal or mercantilist 
                                                 
6 A. Alchian (1977: 127): “In every society conflicts of interest among members of that society must be solved. 
The process by which that resolution (not elimination!) occurs is known as competition. Since, by definition, 
there is no way to eliminate competition, the relevant question is what kind of competition shall be used in the 
resolution of conflicts of interest.” 
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system, a socialist economy and a market economy differ in this sense not in the presence or 
absence of competition but in the different nature of their respective ways of organizing 
competition. To compete for rents to be reaped from privileges in a mercantilist world 
(Ekelund and Tollison 1982) or to compete, in a socialist economy, for desired consumer 
goods by spending time in waiting lines are no less methods of competition than the 
competition in markets. By adopting a market order as its economic constitution a society 
chooses a particular way of organizing competition. That this method makes for a far more 
productive economy than any other known method has been the principal message of modern 
economics since Adam Smith. There is no need to recount this message here.7 Suffice it to say 
that it provides a solid basis for advising the citizens of a democratic polity that it is in their 
common interest to opt for a market order when deciding on the economic constitution under 
which they wish to live. The member states of the EU have made this choice. 
 How market competition works through the market-price mechanism has been 
extensively detailed in economics textbooks. What, from a legal perspective, its fundamental 
characteristics are has been superbly stated by the co-founder of the ordo-liberal Freiburg 
School, Franz Böhm, in his classic article on “Private Law Society and Market Economy” 
(1966). As Böhm explains, market competition is the kind of economic dynamics that results 
within a private law order from the ways in which individuals exercise their private 
autonomy, i.e. the individual liberty that they enjoy within a legal order that protects their 
property rights and freedom of contract.8 A market economy is in this sense, so Böhm argues, 
nothing but the twin sister of a private law society. Adopting a private law order and adopting 
a market economy are not two separate things. The second results as a consequence of 
individual choices when the first is established. 
 Individual liberty as private autonomy is constituted by, and at the same time limited 
by, an effectively enforced legal framework9 that defines mutually compatible private 
domains within which individuals are free to act, protected from encroachment by other 
private law subjects as well as from government intervention. Liberty within a private law 
system means, as F.A. Hayek (1960: 155) puts it, “that what we may do is not dependent on 
the approval of any person or authority and is limited only by the same abstract rules that 
                                                 
7 Alluding to F.A. Hayek’s well known argument on “the use of knowledge in society” E. Hoppmann (1988: 73) 
notes that the economic efficiency of the market order can be explained by the fact that it utilizes far more 
knowledge than any other known economic system. 
8 In the same spirit E.-J. Mestmäcker (2005: 23) notes: “Wettbewerb entsteht aus der Ausübung von 
Freiheitsrechten: der Gewerbefreiheit, der Vertragsfreiheit, des Eigentums und anderer Vermögensrechte. Solche 
Rechte hat es im Privatrecht seit jeher gegeben.” – W. Möschel (2008: 386) echoes: “Wettbewerb … erwächst 
aus der Interaktion individueller Handlungsfreiheiten.” – See also E. Hoppmann (1988: 359). 
9 Mestmäcker (2005: 24): “Das Recht erweist sich damit nicht nur als eine Schranke der Freiheit, sondern als 
ihre Voraussetzung.” 
 9
apply equally to all.” The rules that constitute such liberty or private autonomy are 
proscriptive as opposed to prescriptive rules, they exclude or prohibit certain types of actions 
but otherwise leave an open-ended range of behavioral options from which individuals are 
free to choose.10 It is the essence of a private law order and the market economy that emanates 
from it that the activities of the participants are coordinated by negative or prohibition rules 
(Hoppmann 1988: 262, 273, 305) that leave scope for individual adaptation and explorative 
search for new and potentially better ways of doing things.  
 Freedom to compete in a private law based market economy means the ability to 
exercise one’s private autonomy and to freely choose from the range of behavioral options 
that are not prohibited by the ‘rules of the game.’ And to protect such freedom to compete 
means nothing other then to protect the individual liberty that a private law system provides 
for. 
 
5. Freedom to Compete: The Constitutional and the Sub-Constitutional Level 
In the controversy between advocates and critics of the ‘more economic approach’ a principal 
issue is whether ‘freedom to compete’ or ‘economic efficiency’ should be the guiding goal 
that EU competition policy is supposed to promote (Hellwig 2006; Budzinski 2007; von 
Weizsäcker 2007; Schmidtchen 2008). The emphasis on ‘Wettbewerbsfreiheit’ – or ‘freedom 
to compete’ – as the principal goal of competition policy has been the trademark of German 
ordo-liberalism (Vanberg 2001a). A prominent advocate of this concept among economists 
has been Erich Hoppmann11 who has even claimed that the freedom to compete must, as a 
manifestation of individual economic freedom, be regarded as a “goal in itself” (Hoppmann 
1967: 79).12 It is in particular this claim that is at issue in the ongoing debate on the ‘more 
economic approach.’ My purpose in this section is to show that by distinguishing more 
carefully between the constitutional and the sub-constitutional level of competition policy 
than is typically done by advocates on either side ambiguities that have plagued the debate 
can be avoided. 
 The claim that the ‘freedom to compete’ is a goal in itself seems to imply that, in terms 
of the above distinction between hypothetical and categorical ought-statements, it is meant to 
be a categorical imperative for competition policy. This must provoke, of course, the question 
                                                 
10 Hayek (1960: 19): “Liberty is … a condition in which all is permitted that is not prohibited by general rules.” 
11 Hoppmann (1988: 87): “Die Wettbewerbspolitik hat … als Ziel die Wettbewerbsfreiheit.” 
12 According to Hoppmann (1988: 199) the freedom to compete is “ein Ziel in sich selbst, weil sich in ihm 
wirtschaftliche Freiheit manifestiert.” – Ordo-liberal jurists like Möschel (1989: 147) argue likewise: “The actual 
goal of the competition policy of ordo-liberalism lies in the protection of individual economic of action as a 
value in itself.” 
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of what arguments economics could master to support such a claim without transgressing its 
limits as an empirical science. It is in answering this question that the distinction between the 
constitutional and the sub-constitutional dimension of competition policy is of critical 
importance. What needs to be considered here is the difference between the what competition 
policy should do within a given legal-institutional framework and what its goal should be in 
shaping this framework. 
 As argued above, a society’s choice to opt for a market economy presupposes the 
adoption of a private law order that defines and protects private domains within which 
individuals are free to choose and to enter into voluntary contracts with each other. 
Accordingly, the demand that within a market economy competition policy ought to secure 
the freedom to compete is equivalent to the demand to respect and protect the individual 
liberty that the respective private law order provides for. And this demand is, indeed, a 
categorical imperative once the constitutional choice in favor of a private law society with its 
market economy has been made. It is simply a matter of consistency, since it would be 
inconsistent to choose, at the constitutional level, rules of the game that – by prohibiting 
certain types of actions – negatively circumscribe the domain of individual freedom of choice 
and then, at the sub-constitutional level where the rules are to be enforced, not to respect and 
protect this freedom of choice. 
 When critics such as D. Schmidtchen (2008: 160ff.) and C.C. von Weizsäcker (2007) 
charge that the goal of protecting the freedom to compete is, in effect, an “empty formula” 
that per se, without the assistance of economic efficiency considerations, cannot provide 
guidance for competition policy, they can surely not mean to say that competition authorities 
or courts that are in charge of enforcing the ‘rules of the market game’ cannot know what this 
goal requires them to do. Within an established private law order what individual liberty and, 
hence, freedom to compete means is explicitly defined even if on occasion courts may have to 
decide how, exactly, the existing rules should be interpreted. At the sub-constitutional level, 
in its role of monitoring the ongoing market game, competition policy can surely be guided by 
the goal of protecting the freedom to compete. It would be a violation of individual rights if 
competition agencies would prohibit actions that the existing rules of the game permit or 
would permit actions that are prohibited by these rules, on account of the economic 
inefficiency or efficiency of the overall consequences that the respective actions are presumed 
to produce. It is the essence of a rule-based system of liberty that individuals are protected in 
their freedom to act as long as they do so within the limits set by the rules of the game, that 
their responsibilities are limited to respecting the rights that others enjoy under these rules. It 
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is the principal reason for the productivity of such a rule-based system that individuals, within 
these limits, are free to pursue their own purposes, that they may concentrate their attention on 
matters under their control, and that they are relieved from responsibility for the overall 
welfare consequences that their rule-abiding actions may have.13 The problem of assuring that 
the rule-conforming pursuit of individual interests results overall, even if not in every single 
case, in ‘efficient’ patterns of outcomes is the ‘responsibility’ of the rules of the game. It is a 
problem that has to be solved at the constitutional level by choosing adequate rules. 
 What critics can only have in mind when they classify the goal of economic freedom 
or Wettbewerbsfreiheit as an ‘empty formula’ is that, even if at the sub-constitutional level it 
is meaningful, this goal can no longer be of help at the constitutional level where the very 
rules that define what economic freedom or Wettbewerbsfreiheit entails are to be chosen.14 
Concepts such as private autonomy, individual liberty or economic freedom have a definite 
meaning within a legal-institutional framework that defines and protects private domains 
within which individuals are entitled to freely pursue their own ends. To have meaning at all 
they presuppose, to be sure, the existence of a system of negative or prohibition rules that 
leave room for free individual choice.15 But what the concepts of individual liberty and 
freedom to compete specifically entail is necessarily relative to how they are defined by the 
existing system of rules.16 Their content depends on where the dividing line between the 
public realm and the private domain – i.e. between what is subject to collective, political 
control and what is subject to individual, private choice – is drawn, and on how the rules of 
the private law system define individual rights and responsibilities. And in different private 
                                                 
13 As Mestmäcker (quoted from Möschel 2008: 386) puts it: “Regeln, die autonomes, individuelles Handeln 
ermöglichen und legitimieren, sollen den Einzelnen verantwortliches Entscheidungen in den eigenen 
Angelegenheiten ermöglichen, ohne ihnen die Haftung für die gesamtgesellschaftlichen Folgen ihres Tuns 
aufzuerlegen.” 
14 C.C. von Weizsäcker (2007: 1084) glosses over the critical difference between the constitutional and the sub-
constitutional level when he notes: “Es gibt nicht die Wettbewerbsfreiheit. Gesetzgeber, Behörden und Gerichte 
stehen immer vor der Aufgabe, sich für bestimmte Varianten der Wettbewerbsfreiheit und damit automatisch 
gegen andere Varianten der Wettbewerbsfreiheit zu entscheiden. Bei der Abwägung zwischen verschiedenen 
Varianten der Wettbewerbsfreiheit gibt es keine Kriterien, die es einem erlaubten, allein aus dem Begriff der 
Wettbewerbsfreiheit die eine der anderen Variante vorzuziehen.” 
15 Hoppmann (1988: 85): “Die Spielregeln können sich nur auf das Verhalten der Wettbewerber beziehen. Aus 
der Zielsetzung der Wettbewerbsfreiheit ergibt sich jedoch, dass den einzelnen Marktteilnehmern nicht positiv 
vorgeschrieben werden kann, wie sie handeln müssen. … Es darf ihnen nur vorgeschrieben werden, dass sie 
gewisse Handlungen nicht vornehmen dürfen. Die Spielregeln müssen also negativ formuliert sein.” – See also 
(ibid.: 93): “Wettbewerb als Norm … wird wirtschaftspolitisch verwirklicht, indem man Spielregeln aufstellt, die 
anordnen, was die Marktteilnehmer nicht tun dürfen.” 
16 Hoppmann (1988: 84, 85f.): “Wettbewerbsfreiheit ist relative Freiheit im Rahmen der Marktprozesse. … 
Jedoch geht es bei der Formulierung von Spielregeln … um die Frage des konkreten Freiheitsspielraumes …  
Spielregeln müssen also im einzelnen festlegen, durch welche Handlungen die Wettbewerbsfreiheit unzulässig 
eingeschränkt wird.” – Hoppmann (1967: 80): “Da aber der Freiheitsbereich des einen im Freiheitsbereich des 
anderen seine Grenze findet, kann Freiheit zu Wettbewerb nur in einem relativen Sinne verstanden werden.” 
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law societies with their market economies this line can be drawn differently and the rules of 
private law can be defined differently. 
 Reversely, when advocates of the goal of economic freedom or Wettbewerbsfreiheit 
want to employ this goal as guideline for competition policy, not only at the sub-constitutional 
level but at the constitutional level as well, it can surely not have the same meaning at both 
levels. ‘Economic freedom’ as defined within a system of rules can, quite obviously, not at the 
same time provide the criterion for judging the very rules by which it is defined.17 If it is to 
serve as a standard for judging alternative systems of rules, a standard that can inform 
constitutional choices in a democratic polity, it must be meant as a meta-criterion that allows 
one to compare the different ways in which these systems specify the ‘economic freedom’ 
that they protect.18 However it may be specified at the constitutional level, whether as a 
general preference for rule systems that provide more scope for individual autonomy or 
otherwise, as a goal for competition policy at this level it cannot claim the same categorical 
authority as its sub-constitutional counterpart.19 In a democratic polity it must be argued for in 
terms of reasons for why the citizens-sovereigns should adopt it as a criterion in choosing the 
rules under which they wish to live. And the reasons that economics as an empirical science 
might provide can only be those that appeal to citizens’ common constitutional interests and 
are capable of convincing them that adopting the recommended criterion will be to their 
mutual advantage. In other words, the goal of economic freedom or Wettbewerbsfreiheit can, 
at the constitutional level, only be postulated as a hypothetical imperative. 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Hoppmann (1988: 299) refers to the constitutional level when he notes: “Wettbewerbspolitik hat es de lege 
ferenda mit der Neuformulierung derartiger Verhaltensregeln oder mit der Anpassung bestehender Regeln zu 
tun.” 
18 Schmidtchen (2008: 160) argues similarly without, however, explicitly recognizing the need to distinguish 
between the sub-constitutional and the constitutional level: “Wer aus dem Ziel der Wettbewerbsfreiheit (oder der 
Festlegung ‘des’ Wettbewerbs als Schutzobjekt) Kriterien für die Abgrenzung individueller Handlungsrechte 
ableiten will, der muss entweder auf einen von den individuellen Freiheiten abgesonderten Meta-Freiheitsbegriff 
zurückgreifen (der Kriterien für die Definition individueller Handlungsfreiheiten in Konfliktsituationen 
bereitstellt) oder aber eine Leerformel benutzen.” – Schmidtchen’s ‘Leerformel’-charge may indeed be provoked 
by statements like the following: “Wettbewerb als Norm der Wettbewerbspolitik ist jener Marktprozess, in dem 
sich Wettbwerbsfreiheit … manifestiert” (Hoppmann 1988: 83f.). 
19 Hoppmann (1988: 72) seems to suppose that economic freedom may also serve as a constitutional criterion 
when he argues: “Die Wettbewerbsordnung stellt insofern ein System rechtlich verfasster Freiheiten dar. Daraus 
ergeben sich Rückschlüsse für die Ausgestaltung der Privatrechtsordnung. Wenn die Freiheitsverbürgungen des 
Rechtsstaates ihren Platz auch in der Privatrechtsordnung finden sollen, dann sind der Vertragsfreiheit gewisse 
Grenzen gesetzt.” – The difficulty with this argument is that in defining the limits of the freedom of contract the 
legal framework defines what ‘freedom to compete’ means, and that, if ‘freedom to compete’ is to be a criterion 
that helps to decide how the freedom of contract should be limited, the concept must have two different 
meanings, one for the sub-constitutional and one for the constitutional level.  
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6. The Goal of Competition Policy in a Democratic Society 
The market game – or, in Hayek’s (1976: 115) terms, the “game of catallaxy” – can be played 
according to different rules, and with systematically different rules the market process will 
result in different patterns of outcomes. As Hayek (1960: 229) has put it: “How well the 
market will function depends on the character of the particular rules. The decision to rely on 
voluntary contracts as the main instrument for organizing the relations between individuals 
does not determine what the specific content of the law of contract ought to be; and the 
recognition of the right of private property does not determine what exactly should be the 
content of this right in order that the market mechanism will work as effectively and 
beneficially as possible.” The choice of its specific rules – what the German ordo-liberals 
have called Ordnungspolitik – is the principal method by which the general working 
properties of the market process can be deliberately shaped. 
 The fact that markets can be framed by different rules means that we must distinguish 
between the fundamental or primary constitutional choice of adopting a market economy, 
based on a private law order, and the secondary constitutional choice among potential 
alternative rules for the market game.20 Accordingly, economic policy choices – and the 
advice that economists may provide to citizen cooperatives facing such choices – can be 
located at three levels, at the fundamental constitutional level of deciding on the general type 
of economic order, at the secondary constitutional level of deciding on the specific legal-
institutional framework for the market game, and, lastly, at the sub-constitutional level of 
choosing policies within the existing system of rules that frame the ongoing market process. 
 As has been argued above, advocates of Wettbewerbsfreiheit as a ‘value in itself’ are 
right when they insist that at the sub-constitutional level protecting the private autonomy and 
hence the freedom to compete is a categorical imperative for competition policy in a market 
economy, a duty that cannot be abrogated on grounds of promoting ‘economic efficiency’ or 
for other reasons.21 Yet, the same authority cannot be claimed for Wettbewerbsfreiheit as a 
normative standard at the constitutional level. However ‘freedom to compete’ may be 
specified as a goal for a polity’s choice of its economic constitution, at this level it cannot be 
claimed to be a ‘value in itself’ but must, instead, be argued for in terms of reasons that appeal 
                                                 
20 Hayek (1948: 111) points in effect to this distinction when he notes: “Where the traditional discussion 
becomes so unsatisfactory is where it is suggested that, with the recognition of the principles of private property 
and freedom of contract … all the issues where settled, as if the law of property and contract were given once 
and for all in its final and most appropriate form, i.e. in the form which will make the economy work at its best. 
It is only after we have agreed on these principles that the real problems begin.” 
21 Mestmäcker (2008: 13) points this out when he argues: “Die Wohlstandsförderung ist ein Produkt des 
Wettbewerbsprozesses, ohne zum Tatbestand der Normen zu gehören. Es ist der Zweck dieser Normen, die 
Unternehmen vorab darüber zu informieren, welcher Einsatz im Wettbewerb aus Rechtsgründen ausgeschlossen 
sein soll.” 
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to the interests of those who are the sovereigns for making this choice, i.e. the members of the 
citizen cooperative. In other words, the advice to adopt Wettbewerbsfreiheit as guiding 
standard in choosing the rules for their economy can only be presented as a hypothetical 
imperative, i.e. in terms of arguments for why with such guidance citizens can expect to 
advance their common interests.22 
 Surely, there is scarcely any disagreement between the advocates on either side of the 
current debate on the ‘more economic approach’ in EU competition policy about the 
prudential reasons that can be given to citizens for why opting for a private law order with its 
market economy is to their mutual advantage. Ordo-liberals will, no less than their 
counterparts, emphasize that its superior economic efficiency speaks for choosing a market 
order,23 even if they will put additional emphasis on the intrinsic value of individual liberty 
and the non-economic benefits that a liberal order promises. Such difference in emphasis does 
not alter the fact, though, that ordo-liberal advisors no less than advocates of a ‘more 
economic approach’ need to support their case by arguments that appeal to the interest of the 
citizens who are to choose the economic constitution under which they wish to live. The same 
is true for the ‘secondary constitutional choice,’ the choice among potential alternative rules 
for the market game. However the goal of Wettbewerbsfreiheit may be specified at this level, 
it must be argued for in terms of reasons that tell citizens why choosing the rules of the 
market according to this standard promises to serve their common interests.24 The concept of 
Leistungswettbewerb that plays a central role in the ordo-liberal tradition (Vanberg 1997: 
718ff.; 2001: 3f., 46f.) lends itself to be interpreted, and to be argued for, in just this sense. 
                                                 
22 In a defense of the ‘economic approach’ von Weizsäcker (2007) discusses a number of issues – such as retail 
price maintenance or patent law – where competition policy must de facto choose which type of competition, 
and thereby which form of Wettbewerbsfreiheit, it wants to permit, and he argues that for this choice the concept 
of Wettbewerbsfreiheit cannot provide guidance. As he puts it: “Ich glaube nicht, dass es möglich ist, allein aus 
dem Begriff der Wettbewerbsfreiheit abzuleiten, welcher der beiden Varianten von Wettbewerbsfreiheit der 
Vorzug zu geben ist. … Was liegt dann näher, als eine Abwägung der Vor- und Nachteile der beiden Formen 
von Wettbewerbsfreiheit unter dem Kriterium der Konsumentenwohlfahrt vorzunehmen” (ibid.: 1079). – Von 
Weizsäcker is not explicit about whether his argument is meant to apply only to the constitutional of choice or to 
the sub-constitutional level as well. He notes, though, that his examples are “primarily but nor exclusively a 
matter of legislation” (ibid.: 1080). If it is meant to be about the constitutional choice of rules of competition von 
Weizsäcker’s argument is surely right, but it is equally surely wrong at the sub-constitutional level where the 
rules of the market game have to be enforced and adjudicated. 
23 Hoppmann (1988: 307): “Im Rahmen einer marktwirtschaftlichen Ordnung sind Wettbewerbsfreiheit und 
ökonomische Vorteilhaftigkeit zwei Aspekte des wettbewerblichen Prozesse.” 
24 Hoppmann (1967: 78f.): “Wettbewerbspolitik ist Wirtschaftspolitik zur Gestaltung von Marktprozessen. … 
Von den zahlreichen möglichen Ausprägungen der Marktprozesse sind einige erwünscht, andere sind es nicht. 
… Mit Hilfe der Wettbewerbsdefinition sollen bestimmte gesetzliche Vorschriften, die sogenannten Spielregeln, 
geschaffen werden, um die Marktprozesse in die gewünschten Bahnen zu lenken.” – When Hoppmann argues 
that the rules of the market game serve to give the market process a “desired course,” the “desired” must refer to 
somebody who is considered the relevant judge in this matter. In a democracy this can only be the citizens with 
whom the ultimate authority for choosing the rules resides. 
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 Leistungswettbewerb denotes the ideal of a market order framed by rules that aim at 
making producers responsive to consumer interests or, as Wilhelm Röpke (1960: 31) put it, 
that seek to assure “that the only road to business success is through the narrow gate of better 
performance in service of the consumer.”25 To establish an order of Leistungswettbewerb 
means to adopt rules for the market game that make consumer preferences the ultimate 
controlling force in the process of production.26 As a constitutional ideal for framing market 
processes the concept of Leistungswettbewerb has apparent affinity to the principle of 
consumer sovereignty that – even if not under this name – has been cherished by economists, 
since Adam Smith argued that, because we only produce in order to consume, we should give 
priority to consumer rather than to producer interests when choosing the rules of the economic 
game.27 William H. Hutt (1943: 660) who appears to have coined the term notes that the 
notion of “consumers’ sovereignty” is meant to indicate “that ultimate power to determine the 
use of resources which are ‘scarce’ … shall be vested in the people. It implies that the 
goodness or success of productive effort can be judged only in the light of consumer 
preferences.” To implement this idea, so Hutt (ibid.) emphasizes, requires deliberate 
“institutional planning” by contrast to “laissez-faire in the popular sense,” it requires the 
“fashioning of a framework” that is conducive to this purpose.28 
 To Adam Smith (1981: 660) the maxim of Leistungswettbewerb or consumer 
sovereignty appeared “so perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd to attempt to prove 
it.” Since the advent of utilitarian welfare economics what was self-evident for Adam Smith is 
no longer taken for granted in the academic profession that he helped to create. There has 
been, and continues to be, controversy about whether or not total welfare, i.e. the sum of 
consumer and producer surplus, is a more adequate measure of economic efficiency than 
                                                 
25 Mises (1981:   ): “The only way to acquire wealth and to preserve it, in a market economy not adulterated by 
government-made privileges and restrictions, is to serve the consumers in the best and cheapest way.” 
26 As Franz Böhm (1980: 90) put it metaphorically, it means to place “the consumer directly at the manual of the 
economy-organ.”  
27 A. Smith (1981: 660): “Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the 
producer ought to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer. The 
maxim is so perfectly self-evident, that it would be absurd to attempt to prove it.” – In similar words Ludwig von 
Mises (1981:400) notes about the market: “People produce, not for the sake of production, but for the goods that 
may be consumed. As producer in an economy based on the division of labor, a man is merely the agent of the 
community and as such has to obey. Only as a consumer can he command.” 
28 It is the task of ‘fashioning a framework’ that gives the competitive market process desirable working 
properties that, as Mestmäcker (2008: 13) puts it, makes it possible and necessary, “Normen gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen in Auseinandersetzung mit tradierten öffentlich-rechtlichen und privatrechtlichen 
Vorgaben als eine selbständige wirtschaftsrechtliche Disziplin zu entwickeln…. Die mit diesen Normen 
notwendig verbundenen Eingriffe in die Handlungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheiten, aus denen der Wettbewerb 
entsteht, dessen Funktionsfähigkeit im öffentlichen Interesse zu gewährleisten ist, erklären die wichtigsten 
Eigenarten dieser Normen. … Es sind die Verbraucher, die von der Freiheit der Konsumwahl Gebrauch machen, 
von deren Entscheidungen Erfolg oder Misserfolg im Wettbewerb wesentlich abhängen.”  
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consumer welfare alone.29 From a constitutional economics perspective there is a clear answer 
to the question of how this dispute ought to be decided.30 Interpreted as alternative 
hypothetical imperatives the opposing views on what should be the guiding principle in 
framing market processes should be judged in terms of how well they can be supported by 
arguments that appeal to the common interests of their ultimate addressees in a democratic 
polity, the citizens. 
 The advocates of a total welfare standard may seek to support their case by reminding 
citizens of the fact that they take part in the economy not only as consumers but on the 
producer side as well – be it as employees, as investors or in other capacities – and that, 
accordingly, giving priority to consumer sovereignty would mean to neglect an important part 
of their more inclusive economic interests. If advocating the principle of Leistungswettbewerb 
would indeed amount to an arbitrary preference for a partial interest, Adam Smith’s claim that 
it is a “perfectly self-evident” maxim would be difficult to defend. Yet, neither Adam Smith 
nor other advocates of the principle of consumer sovereignty have simply ignored the obvious 
fact that people are concerned about their interests as producers as well. Their case must rest 
on the claim that, considering their encompassing interests and notwithstanding their double 
affectedness, citizens can expect to be better off overall by adopting an economic constitution 
of Leistungswettbewerb, even if being exposed to such competition as producers may be an 
unwelcome burden.31 The essential, if rarely explicitly stated argument supporting this claim 
is that citizens’ interests as producers in escaping the burden of competition do not qualify as 
common interests that they share across different producer groups, but are sectional interests 
that are in conflict between different groups. Producers in industry A who are on the demand 
side for products of industry B are harmed by restraints of competition in the latter, and vice 
versa. By contrast, in their capacity as consumers citizens are not separated by sectional 
divides but share a common interest in a regime of Leistungswettbewerb. That they are 
consumers as well as producers means that citizens are facing a trade-off between, on the one 
side, the advantages they can expect as consumers and the burden they have to carry as 
producers in a regime of Leistungswettbewerb and, on the other side, the benefits they can 
                                                 
29 See Hellwig (2007: 32) for references to this controversy. 
30 For a discussion of the ‘total welfare versus consumer welfare’ issue from a constitutional economics 
perspective that differs somewhat from the line of argument developed here see W. Kerber (2008: 17ff.).  
31 Hutt (1990: 257f.): “In regarding the individual as consumer, we do not see him in his full relationship to 
society. He is usually also a producer. But as a producer he is the servant of the community. … As a ‘consumer’, 
each directs. As a ‘producer’, each obeys.” –  Referring to the fact that in their capacity as producers individuals 
may be negatively affected by competition Hayek (1976: 121) asks the question: “Does this mean that something 
is disregarded that ought to be taken into account in the formation of a desirable order?” His answer is that these 
disadvantages are compensated by the benefits effects of a competitive order. As he (ibid.: 122) notes: “And 
though in the short run the unfavorable effects may out-balance the sum of the indirect beneficial effects, in the 
long run the sum of all those particular effects … are likely to improve the chances of all.” 
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expect in a producer-friendly regime from restraints of competition in their own industry and 
the disadvantages that will result from restraints of competition in other industries whose 
products they consume or need as inputs for their own production. 
 While it may be tempting for any single group of producers to seek protection from 
competition in an otherwise competitive environment, to opt for an economic constitution that 
assures Leistungswettbewerb rather than one that gives room to anticompetitive producer 
interests can be recommended to citizens, because they can expect to be compensated for the 
disadvantages they suffer as producers from their exposure to competition by the far greater 
advantages they will realize as consumers because other producer are exposed to the 
discipline of Leistungswettbewerb as well.32 In other words, adopting rules for the market 
game that promote consumer sovereignty is to the mutual advantage of citizens because, even 
though there will always be occasions in which they will be harmed in their interests as 
producers, the benefits they will realize as consumers over the course of the market game will 
assure them “general compensation” (Fehl and Schreiter 1997: 220; Vanberg 2001a: 53). 
 
7. Consumer Welfare, Economic Freedom and the ‘More Economic Approach’ 
What has been said at the outset of this paper about the general controversy around the ‘more 
economic approach’ can be said as well about the debate on whether total welfare or 
consumer welfare is the more adequate measure of economic efficiency. Ambiguities that 
have plagued this debate can be avoided if more attention is paid to the distinction between 
the constitutional level at which the rules of the market game are chosen and the sub-
constitutional level of policy choices within a given legal-institutional framework. When the 
task is to advise citizens in matters of economic policy this distinction is critical, because 
there is a categorical difference between assessing the welfare consequences of alternative 
options at the constitutional level by contrast to the sub-constitutional level. 
 When the focus is on assessing the welfare consequences of policy measures in 
particular instances advising citizens to consider only their interests as consumers and to 
ignore their interests as producers must, indeed, seem arbitrary and the addressees of such 
advice may well doubt its wisdom. To make a convincing argument to citizens why, at the 
sub-constitutional level, a competition policy that, for instance, prohibits and penalizes cartel 
agreements is in their common interest is hardly possible because the negatively affected 
                                                 
32 Hoppmann (1967: 80): “Wenn ein dauernder Anreiz zur Leistungssteigerung beispielsweise unter den 
Anbietern wirksam ist und die Leistungsähigsten zum Zuge kommen, dann ist das für jeden einzelnen 
Nachfrager ökonomisch vorteilhaft. Das gleiche gilt, mutatis mutandis, für jeden Anbieter im Hinblick auf die 
Nachfrageseite. Jeder Marktteilnehmer erzielt also einen ökonomischen Vorteil.” 
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cartelists cannot be expected to agree that such policy is serving their interests. It is, however, 
an entirely different project, and one that is more likely to succeed, to provide arguments to 
citizens for why it is in their common interest to accept rules of the game that prohibit cartels. 
This can be argued on the ground that the pattern of outcomes that the market game promises 
to produce under such rules will be more beneficial to all of them even if there will be 
instances where they would prefer not to be subject to these rules.  
 Advising citizens from constitutional economics perspective means to alert them to the 
advantages of a constitutional regime that prohibits cartel agreements – or, more generally, of 
a regime of Leistungswettbewerb – compared to alternative regimes, and to point out that, if 
they choose to adopt such a regime for its advantages, they are necessarily bound by its rules 
at the sub-constitutional level. Accepting the burdens that a regime of Leistungswettbewerb 
imposes on producers is a categorical duty that citizens must accept if they choose, at the 
constitutional level, to adopt such a regime.33 The advice to adopt the regime can only be 
stated as a hypothetical imperative that appeals to citizens interests. The demand to honor its 
rules, once it is chosen, is a categorical imperative. 
 Apart from the fact, discussed above, that conventional welfare economics lacks 
clarity about the intended addressee of its advice, it is its failure to be explicit about the level 
at which its welfare calculus is meant to apply that causes the disagreement on whether 
consumer welfare or total welfare should be given priority. It is with its sub-constitutional 
focus on the welfare effects of particular policy measures that Paretian welfare economics 
faces what Martin Hellwig (2006: 240) calls “the embarrassing question of a potential 
compensation of cartelists and dominant firms for the consequences of competition policy.” It 
faces this “embarrassing question” because – by contrast to constitutional economics – it has 
no arguments in its repertoire for why cartelists could be requested to tolerate the burden that 
anti-cartel policies impose on them.34 If it were to apply its logic consistently to the 
constitutional level, Paretian welfare economics would converge with constitutional 
economics because its search for rules that make at least one person better off without making 
                                                 
33 Mestmäcker (2005: 25): “Der Wettbewerb selbst, der aus der Gewährung umfassender Freiheitsrechte entsteht, 
bedeutet für diejenigen, die sich daran in Ausübung ihrer Autonomie beteiligen, auch die Hinnahme der sich 
daraus ergebenden Widrigkeiten. … Das impliziert ein wichtiges wettbewerbsrechtliches Prinzip. Schäden, die 
sich Wettbewerber im redlichen Wettbewerb zufügen, sind nicht rechtswidrig.” 
34 Hellwig (2007: 33f.): “Das Wettbewerbsrecht beschränkt die Handlungsspielräume von Unternehmen, 
potentiellen Kartellisten und Marktbeherrschern, ohne dass die Unternehmen und ihre Eigentümer dafür 
kompensiert würden. Solche Eingriffe sind mit dem Pareto Kriterium nicht zu begründen. … Meines Erachtens 
muss eine normative Grundlegung der Wettbewerbspolitik auch … erklären, warum ein Kartellverbot ohne 
Kompensation von den Betroffenen zu akzeptieren ist. Ein reines Effizienzziel ist dafür nicht geeignet.” 
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anybody else worth off would lead to the same result as the constitutional economist’s search 
for rules that promise mutual benefits to the parties involved.35 
 The failure to be explicit about whether welfare assessments in a market economy 
have their proper place at the constitutional or the sub-constitutional level is not only the 
source of confusion in the ‘consumer welfare versus total welfare’ issue it is also the principal 
source of confusion in the controversy on the relation between ‘economic freedom’ and 
‘economic efficiency’ as criteria for guiding economic policy. Arguments on welfare effects 
are surely arguments that the members of a citizen cooperative have reasons to consider in 
choosing their economic constitution, and advocates of the ideal of economic freedom or 
Wettbewerbsfreiheit would obviously miss something important if they would not include 
such arguments in their advice. The relevant issue is, therefore, not about whether economic 
efficiency arguments have a role to play in advising competition policy. It is, instead, about 
the proper level at which they have to play their role.36 The advocates of economic freedom 
and Leistungswettbewerb have no reason to deny that comparing the prospective welfare 
effects of alternative rules of the market game is an essential prerequisite in choosing an 
economic constitution, and that economics can provide an important service by informing 
about the working properties of potential alternative systems of rules. What they reject is the 
claim that a ‘more economic approach’ can help to improve competition policy by informing 
about the specific welfare effects in particular instances. In other words, the relevant 
controversy is about whether economic efficiency arguments have their proper place at the 
constitutional level, i.e. in providing advice for the choice of rules, or at the sub-constitutional 
level, i.e. in advising competition policy in its day-to-day operation.37 
                                                 
35 Traditional welfare economics can, as Hellwig (2006: 238) argues, not explain which policy interventions are 
commensurate with a free society, and cannot answer the question of what legitimizes coercive measures of 
competition policy that make cartelists and dominant firms worse off. – Hellwig accuses German ordo-liberalism 
of being subject to the same charge insofar as they posit that cartels and monopolies impair the working of the 
market system (ibid.: 239). With such critique Hellwig ignores that the ordo-liberal anti-cartel and anti-
monopoly argument is explicitly, and emphatically so by Franz Böhm, made at the constitutional level. It has to 
be admitted, though, that by employing the outcome-oriented criterion of ‘complete competition’ in addition to 
the procedural and rule-oriented criterion of Leistungswettbewerb ordo-liberal authors have introduced 
ambiguity in their argument that invites the kind of critique that Hellwig voices. On a careful study of the ordo-
liberal research program it should however be apparent that the criterion of Leistungswettbewerb is the one that 
is in line with the fundamental logic of this approach and that the criterion of ‘complete competition’ can be 
ignored without any loss in its explanatory power (Vanberg 1997: 719f.). 
36 Mestmäcker (2005: 29): “Transaktionen, die Teil des Wettbewerbsprozesses sind, können nicht anhand ihrer 
Ergebnisse beurteilt warden. Normen gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen müssen vielmehr in Übereinstimmung 
mit dem System ausgelegt und angewendet werden, das sie sichern sollen. … Es geht nicht um eine Analyse mit 
oder ohne Wirtschaftswissenschaften. Es geht um die Vereinbarkeit des Effizienzkriteriums mit dem vor 
Beschränkungen und Marktbeherrschung zu schützenden Wettbewerb.” 
37 Mestmäcker (2008: 14): “Es gibt keine Meinungsverschiedenheit darüber, ob die Wettbewerbsfreiheit einen 
‘Economic Approach’ verlangt. Es gibt aber Meinungsverschiedenheiten darüber, ob der ‘More Economic 
Approach’ der EG-Kommission … der einzig richtige Economic Approach ist. Dazu gehört, dass er auch mit den 
Wettbewerbsregeln des Rechts vereinbar ist.” 
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 As has been indicated above, the principle reason for advocates of the goal of 
economic freedom or Wettbewerbsfreiheit to reject an ‘effects-based approach’ that applies 
efficiency considerations at the sub-constitutional level is that such guidance for competition 
policy is in conflict with the requirements that follow from adopting a market order and the 
private law system on which it is based. Whatever efficiency arguments may legitimately 
inform the choice of rules that are to frame the market process, within the rules chosen the 
private autonomy that they provide for must be respected and the freedom of choice that is the 
substance of private autonomy cannot be made contingent on assessments of the welfare 
effects that result from its use. There is no conflict between using consumer sovereignty as a 
criterion in choosing the rules for the market game, but it would be inconsistent with a private 
law system to allow actions that it prohibits or to prohibit actions that it permits because of the 
positive or negative welfare effects they are predicted to produce in particular instances. 
 The consistency argument is about the level at which economists should apply their 
advice, considering the fundamental legal properties of a market economy. From a 
constitutional economics perspective there is, though, a second kind of argument that can be 
made against an ‘effects-based approach,’ an argument that is about the level at which 
economists can competently provide advice, considering the limits of knowledge that their 
discipline is subject to. In the controversy on the ‘modernization’ of EU competition law this 
second argument is usually not clearly separated from the first, but it is of a different nature 
and deserves separate consideration. The next section will take a brief look at this argument. 
 
8. The Reason of Rules and the Rule of Reason 
The principal claim made by the advocates of an ‘effects-based approach’ is that, compared to 
the traditional ‘form-based’ or rule-oriented approach, it allows competition policy to be more 
accurate in discriminating between business practices that promote economic efficiency – or 
consumer welfare – and those that do not.38 In cases where the pro-competitive or efficiency 
effects of business practices are found to outbalance their anti-competitive effects, so the 
advocates argue, competition policy should adopt a ‘rule-of-reason’ standard instead of 
following per-se-rules (Schmidtchen 2007a: 97).39 Critics have charged that the downside of 
                                                 
38 According to Schmidtchen (2007a: 96f.) an ‘effects-based approach’ that judges business behavior and 
government actions in light of its effects in each particular case (“anhand einer Einzelfallanalyse”) has the 
advantage of distinguishing more accurately pro-competitive and efficiency promoting practices from anti-
competitive behavior than legal per se rules.  
39 Schmidt and Voigt (2007: 34f.): “Die angestrebte stärkere Einzelfallbeurteilung soll durch eine Aufwertung 
der ‘rule of reason’ erfolgen. Im Umkehrschluss bedeutet das somit eine Abwertung von ‘per se’ Regeln. … ‘Per 
se’-Regeln grenzen erlaubte von verbotenen Handlungen ab. Erlaubnis bzw. Verbot gelten prinzipiell … . Unter 
der ‘rule of reason’ wird hingegen versucht, die Vor- und Nachteile einer Handlung im spezifischen 
 21
the approach is a loss in legal certainty because market participants can no longer tell from the 
rules of the market game what strategies are prohibited, and among which options they are 
free to choose, but that what they may do or not do depends on how the competition agencies, 
informed by their economic advisors, will assess the welfare consequences in particular 
instances. This charge has triggered a debate on an alleged trade-off between accuracy and 
legal certainty (Treffsicherheit und Rechtssicherheit) and on how a ‘modern’ competition 
policy ought to position itself in light of such a trade-off.40 
 There is no need here to comment on the charge that an ‘effects-based approach’ that 
seeks to decide each individual case ‘on its own merits,’ i.e. in light of its particular welfare 
effects, is inimical to the principal of legal certainty, because this charge is directly related to 
the problem, extensively discussed in previous sections, that such sub-constitutional ‘welfarist 
instrumentalism’ is in conflict with the essential ingredient of a market order, namely that as 
private law subjects market participants are constrained in their choices only be negative rules 
that prohibit certain types of actions but are otherwise free to exercise their private 
autonomy.41 What deserves to be commented upon, however, is the fact that some authors in 
speaking of a trade-off between accuracy and legal certainty appear to take if for granted that 
an ‘effects-based approach’ is indeed capable of improving the accuracy or Treffsicherheit of 
the decisions that competition agencies are called upon to make, and that the advantages that 
come from such improvement in decision quality can outbalance the disadvantages from a 
loss in legal certainty or Rechtssicherheit.42 There are reasons to doubt that this implicit claim 
is well grounded. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Entscheidungskontext einzeln zu bewerten – und dann ein Urteil über die Rechtmäßigkeit eine bestimmten 
Handlung zu treffen.” 
40 In their comment on this controversy Schmidt and Voigt (2007: 36ff.) point out that an adequate account of 
the trade-off between a ‘form-based’ and an ‘effects-based approach’ has to include such things as the additional 
administrative costs that the latter involves and the greater scope it allows for interest-group lobbying. They  
arrive at the conclusion: “Ob der ‘more economic approach’ tatsächlich ökonomisch ist, ist zu bezweifeln, da der 
zusätzliche Nutzen in der Form besserer Entscheidungen mehr als vage ist. Dem stehen jedoch die zusätzlichen 
Kosten in Form höherer Rechtsunsicherheit, höherer Verfahrens- und Entscheidungskosten sowie die Gefahr von 
Wohlfahrtsverlusten durch wachsende Möglichkeiten der Einflussnahme auf die jeweiligen Entscheidungen 
gegenüber.” 
41 To characterize the issue that is raised by an ‘effects-based approach’ in terms of the trade-off between 
accuracy and legal certainty is in effect misleading because it distracts from the much more important problem 
that the nature of the ‘economic game’ is fundamentally changed if the ‘players’ can no longer trust that their 
actions will be measured against general rules but must expect that what they may do or not do will depend on 
how the welfare consequences of their choices will be assessed in particular instances. The trade-off perspective 
implicitly supposes that the economic agents’ behavior remains essentially the same and that the only question is 
whether competition agencies or courts assess their actions more or less accurately. This supposition is, however, 
clearly false. 
42 Hellwig (2007: 16f.): “Eine solche Per-se-Regel hat den Vorzug, dass die Betroffenen wissen, woran sie sind. 
… Diesen Vorzügen steht der Nachteil gegenüber, dass die Normierung eines Gefährdungstatbestandes 
naturgemäß nicht den Umständen des Einzelfalls Rechnung trägt. Dadurch geht Information verloren. … 
Grundsätzlich ist davon auszugehen, dass die Rechtssicherheit bei einer Per-se-Regel mit einer Einbuße an 
Treffsicherheit der Wettbewerbspolitik erkauft wird. Im konkreten Einzelfall steht mehr Information zur 
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 The general argument that throws doubt on the claim that by deciding each case on its 
own ‘welfare-merits’ competition policy can improve the ‘accuracy’ of its decisions can be 
found in Hayek’s writings, and it has been worked out in more detail by Ronald Heiner.43 In 
brief, and applied to the case of competition policy, the argument is as follows. If competition 
agencies, informed by their economic advisors, were perfect in predicting the welfare 
consequences of business practices in each and every case, their decisions would obviously be 
more ‘accurate’ under an ‘effects-based approach’ than the decisions at which they would 
arrive in following a ‘form-based approach’ and judging cases according to general rules. 
This is, however, no longer assured when competition agencies and their economic advisors 
are not perfect and subject to errors in their attempts to assess the overall welfare 
consequences in particular instances. What needs to be compared in this case is the pattern of 
decisions that will result from a ‘form-based approach’ on the one side and from an ‘effects-
based approach’ on the other, or, more precisely, the rate of errors that will occur under either 
regime. Whether an ‘effects-based approach’ will produce relatively less errors than a ‘form-
based approach,’ or the other way around, will depend on the fallibility or error-proneness of 
the competition agency compared to the ‘fallibility’ or imperfectness of the rules that are 
applied.44 
 Advocates of the ‘effects-based approach’ are obviously quite optimistic that the 
analytical and statistical tools of modern industrial economics are capable of increasing the 
decision-competence of competition agencies sufficiently to surpass the decision-quality that 
can be expected from the guidance of general rules.45 Their critics doubt that such optimism is 
justified if we consider the enormous complexity of socio-economic systems that severely 
limits our capability to predict the overall, direct and indirect consequences that particular 
                                                                                                                                                        
Verfügung als bei der Normierung eines Gefährdungstatbestandes. Bei Anwendung einer Per-se-Regel wird 
diese Information nicht genutzt. … Aus der allgemeinen Theorie der Entscheidung bei unvollkommener 
Information wissen wir, dass es immer besser ist, zusätzliche Information zu nutzen.” 
43 Vanberg (1994: 176ff., 181ff.). 
44 What A.P. Lerner (quoted in Hayek 1960: 428 fn.) has said in reference to the free-trade doctrine applies as 
well to competition policy: “As with all general rules, there are particular cases where, if one knew all the 
attendant circumstances and the full effects in all their ramifications, it would be better for the rule not to be 
applied. But that does not make the rule a bad rule or give reason for not applying the rule where, as is normally 
the case, one does not know all the ramifications that would make the case a desirable exception.” 
45 Advocating an “effects-based approach” Röller (2005: 40) notes about the problem of merger control: “Mit 
einer einfachen Regel kann es somit passieren, dass ein Zusammenschluss untersagt wird, obwohl der die 
Konsumentenwohlfahrt erhöhen würde. Das ist der Fall, wenn es sehr hohe Effizienzvorteile gibt und 
gleichzeitig wettbewerbliche Beeinträchtigungen zu erwarten sind, insgesamt aber die Konsumenten von diesen 
Effizienzvorteilen profitieren.” – In reference to such claim Möschel (2008: 387) comments: “Ohne 
entsprechenden Wettbewerbsdruck gibt es für Unternehmen in aller Regel – man kann Ausnahmemodelle 
konstruieren – keinen Anreiz, Effizienzvorteile, die aus einem Zusammenschluss erwachsen, an die jeweilige 
Marktgegenseite weiterzugeben. Da Marktbeherrschung gerade das Dementi solchen Wettbewerbsdrucks ist, … 
erscheint die klassische Auffassung, Effizienzüberlegungen angesichts deren spekulativen Gehalts nicht im 
Einzelfall zu berücksichtigen, sondern abstrakt-generell durch eine Vorweganhebung der Eingriffsschwelle in 
der Fusionskontrolle … als das vorzugswürdige Konzept.” – On this issue see also Mestmäcker (2005: 31). 
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measures will produce in an intricate network of interdependent individual choices and in a 
dynamic process that is driven by the creativeness of adaptive human agents.46 As Hayek has 
insisted, it is because of the inescapable limits of our knowledge that in a complex 
environment we need – at the individual level as well as on the level of collective, political 
choices – the guidance of rules that relieve us from the need ‘to consider everything’ and 
focus our attention on selected criteria for our decisions.47 Such rules that make us selectively 
attentive to particular features of a choice situation can, to be sure, not guarantee optimal 
choices in every instance, but they can help us to do better overall than if we would attempt to 
‘optimize’ in a discretionary case-by-case manner.48 Hayek’s central message is that in 
economics like in other sciences that deal with complex open systems our ability to predict is 
limited to “explanations of the principle” and to “pattern predictions” (Hayek 1967). We can 
aim, so Hayek argues, at explaining and predicting the general effects that result from 
systematic changes in the boundary conditions under which the system operates, but the 
complexity and multitude of specific circumstances that work in particular instances make it 
impossible for us to fully explain single events or to predict the specific consequences that 
particular interventions will produce. An ‘effects-based approach’ that seeks to apply the 
efficiency test to particular cases needs to rely on the latter kind of prediction. A ‘form-based 
approach’ can work with pattern predictions.49 
 The essential issue of whether an ‘effects-based approach’ can improve the decision 
praxis of competition agencies compared to a ‘form-based approach’ has been clouded by 
being confounded in the ongoing debate with other, separate and different issues, in particular 
                                                 
46 Schmidt and Voigt (2007: 40f.): “Industrieökonomische Modelle bilden die theoretische Basis der 
Wettbewerbspolitik, fraglich ist nur, ob das Treffen von Einzelfallentscheidungen auf der Basis spezifischer 
industrieökonomischer Modelle zu einer Erhöhung der Entscheidungsqualität führt. … Hierbei ist kritisch zu 
fragen, inwieweit modellbasierte Simulationsanalysen überhaupt in der Lage sind, dynamische 
Wettbewerbsprozesse abzubilden.” 
47 There is no room here to go into the details of Hayek’s argument on the limits of our knowledge and the 
reason of rules or of his related argument on the limitation of sciences of complex phenomena to explanations of 
the principle and to pattern predictions. For a more detailed discussion see Vanberg (1994: 111ff.;2001b: 77ff.). 
48 The thrust of Hayek’s argument is directly opposed to Hellwig’s (2007: 17) claim “that it is always better to 
use additional information.” It is, so Hayek (1964: 11) insists, the essence of rules that they require us to 
“systematically disregard certain facts which we know,” and he explains: “It may sound paradoxical that 
rationality should thus require that we deliberately disregard knowledge which we possess; but this is part of the 
necessity of coming to terms with our unalterable ignorance of much that would be relevant if we knew it.” 
49 Schmidtchen (2007a: 98) is surely right when he argues that “traditional competition policy” must also rely on 
predictions. Yet, the need to rely on pattern predictions is critically different from the predictive power that an 
‘effects-based approach’ must rely on. – Budzinski (2007: 16): “Wettbewerbsfreiheit als wettbewerbspolitisches 
Leitbild geht also davon aus, aufgrund von prinzipiellen Wissensmängeln nicht endgültig festlegen zu können, 
welche Wirkungen aus einer isolierten Handlung resultieren und wie die Akteure im Wettbewerb handeln 
sollten, um die Konsumentenwohlfahrt zu maximieren. Stattdessen wird erheblich bescheidener nur in Anspruch 
genommen, bestimmte Handlungsweisen als normalerweise (Musteraussage!) wohlfahrtsschädlich identifizieren 
zu können (bspw. mit Hilfe der Industrieökonomik), mit der Konsequenz, diese durch die Wettbewerbsregeln 
allgemein zu unterbinden.” 
 24
with the issue of whether competition agencies may need to rely on economic expertise in 
applying the existing competition law to particular cases, and with the issue of whether 
economic expertise may be needed in specifying existing competition laws that are too 
simple. As far as the first of these separate issues is concerned, it is surely true that applying 
legal rules – whether in competition law or otherwise – is not a purely mechanical act but 
often a complex process of interpretation that has to use theoretical and empirical knowledge. 
It is entirely uncontroversial that, in this sense, competition agencies in enforcing the rules of 
the market game may need to rely on knowledge about factual matters that only economics 
can provide, especially in cases where the rules include general clauses that need to be 
interpreted in light of the particular facts in a given case. There is, however, a categorical 
difference between, on the one side, the entirely uncontroversial claim that economists can 
provide valuable assistance to competition agencies for deciding how existing legal rules are 
to be applied to particular cases and, on the other side, the claim that competition agencies 
should make their decisions to permit or prohibit certain business practices contingent on how 
economists assess their welfare effects in particular cases. If the ‘effects-based approach’ 
were only about the first claim the whole controversy about ‘economizing’ EU competition 
policy would be no more than a superfluous storm in a teacup. It is only the second claim that 
qualifies the ‘more economic approach’ as a relevant subject of controversy. 
 The second separate issue that tends to be confounded with the issue of whether a 
case-by-case assessment of welfare consequences should guide competition policy is the 
question of whether economic expertise can help to refine competition law. Even though there 
is a categorical difference between them, advocates of an ‘effects-based approach’ are not 
always unambiguous about which of the two claims they wish to make.50 It is one thing to 
claim that economics can help to improve competition policy by providing knowledge on how 
competition laws can be drafted in ways that more reliably differentiate welfare-enhancing 
from detrimental business practices.51 It is an entirely different thing to claim that competition 
policy can be improved by judging each individual case on the basis of its predicted welfare 
                                                 
50 On the one hand Röller (2005: 39) argues that the “effect based approach” emphasizes the necessity, “in allen 
Fällen ebenfalls die Auswirkungen … auf den Konsumenten zu untersuchen, on the other hand he notes about 
the purpose of the efforts to ‘modernize’ EU competition policy: “Dabei geht es nicht um eine übertriebene 
Verkomplizierung der Regeln durch eine falsch verstandene ‘Ökonomisierung’ der Missbrauchsaufsicht. … Ziel 
eines modernen ökonomischen Ansatzes ist es, klare und transparente Regeln zu erstellen, welche einer 
fundierten ökonomischen Betrachtungsweise von Märkten besser standhalten“ (ibid.: 42). 
51 It is certainly legitimate to ask, as Schmidtchen (2007a: 98) does: “Welchen  Nutzen hat die Gesellschaft aus 
der sicheren Anwendung von Regeln, die ineffiziente Ergebnisse liefern?” But the critical question is whether 
the remedy is seen in replacing ‘inefficient’ rules by more appropriate rules – based on what Schmidtchen (ibid: 
98) calls a “comparative institutions approach” – or in an ‘effects-based approach’ that judges each case on its 
own merits, aiming at “Einzelfallgerechtigkeit” (ibid.). 
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consequences.52 Again, if the ‘effects-based approach’ were only about the first claim it 
would not be worthwhile to quarrel about it. Advocates of a ‘form-based’ or rule-governed 
approach have no reason whatsoever to deny that economics has an important role to play in 
informing about the prospective working properties of alternative rules. On the contrary, it is 
their principal message that economists’ advice about welfare effects has its proper place at 
the constitutional level where the rules of the market game are chosen rather than at the sub-
constitutional level where competition agencies face the task of deciding what the rules imply 
for particular cases.53 In other words, there is no controversy at all about the need for 
competition policy to consider the economic effects of its measures or about the obvious fact 
that economics is the natural discipline to inform about such effects.54 What makes the 
‘effects-based approach’ controversial is the tendency of its advocates to ignore the critical 
difference between the roles that economics can play in this regard at the constitutional and at 
the sub-constitutional level.55 
 In a number of recent papers Wolfgang Kerber (Kerber 2007; Christiansen and Kerber 
2006; Kerber, Kretschmer, von Wangenheim 2008) has made an effort to reconcile the two 
sides in the controversy on the ‘more economic approach’ by suggesting that attention should 
be shifted away from the “outdated dichotomy of ‘per-se rules vs. rule of reason’” to the more 
productive issue of “optimally differentiated rules.”56 Competition policy can indeed, so 
                                                 
52 In light of Hayek’s arguments on the ‘reason of rules’ in a complex world it is surprising when Hellwig (2007: 
17) argues: “Der Zielkonflikt zwischen Rechtssicherheit und Treffsicherheit der Wettbewerbspolitik kann durch 
eine stärker ausdifferenzierte Formulierung von Regeln zwar gemildert, aber nicht gänzlich aufgehoben werde. 
… Unsere Fähigkeiten zur Formulierung von Regeln sind begrenzt, und die Wirklichkeit ist zu komplex, als dass 
wir allen relevanten Eventualitäten und Kriterien schon auf der Ebene der Regelformulierung Rechnung tragen 
könnten.” 
53 Christiansen and Kerber (2006: 237): “Thus there is no trade off between ‘more economics’ and a rule-based 
competition policy, rather competition rules should be grounded in economics. Since the optimal rules are the 
result of a comparison of alternative rules in regard to their average welfare effects (including decision errors and 
regulation costs), a rule-based competition policy is also based on an ‘effects-based approach’.” 
54 Controversial are, therefore, neither Hellwig’s (2007: 20) argument that competition policy must be based on 
“eine angemessene Analyse der Wirkungszusammenhänge” nor his demand, “dass Jurisprudenz als die für die 
Norminterpretation zuständige Wissenschaft und Wirtschaftstheorie als die für die Sachzusammenhänge 
zuständige Wissenschaft zusammenarbeiten” (ibid.: 39). 
55 As Schmidt and Voigt (2007: 47) argue: “Die Umsetzung des ‘more economic approach’ sollte daher nicht bei 
der Regelanwendung ansetzen, sondern vielmehr bei der Regelsetzung. Hierin ist der Konstruktionsfehler des 
ökonomischeren Ansatzes auf der europäischen Ebene zu sehen. … D.h. die Erkenntnisse der ökonomischen 
Theorie sollten sich bereits in den Wettbewerbsregeln widerspiegeln und nicht der Rechtsauslegung durch die 
Kartellbehörden bzw. die Gerichte unterliegen.” 
56 Kerber (2007: 3): “The debate about per se rules vs. rule of reason does not reflect sufficiently that there is in 
fact a continuum between a simple per se rule and a full-scale market analysis of all effects in a specific case.” – 
Christiansen and Kerber (2006: 216): “Starting with the traditional, but outdated dichotomy of ‘per se rules vs. 
rule of reason’, we elaborate the notion of a continuum of intermediate solutions between those two extremes 
and ask for the conditions and the determinants for optimally differentiated rules.” – It is, in fact, somewhat 
misleading to speak of “differentiated” rules as if they were located between “two extremes” of which “per se 
rules” represent one endpoint. There is indeed a dichotomy between a competition policy that is guided by rules 
and one that is based on case-by-case decisions, but ‘differentiated rules’ are clearly located on one side and not 
between the two. In the context of Christiansen’s and Kerber’s argument ‘per se rules’ must apparently be 
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Kerber argues, benefit from a ‘more economic approach’ that informs about how competition 
law may be specified in ways that reduce the risk of prohibiting business practices that are in 
fact welfare improving, i.e. serving the common interests of the individuals involved. In 
speaking of “optimally differentiated” rules Kerber refers to the trade-off between the degree 
of specificity of rules and the reliability with which they can be applied. To increase the 
specificity of rules means to increase the number and variety of circumstances that they 
account for. While this may improve their accuracy or Treffsicherheit, it increases the 
difficulty of their reliable application. As in the limiting of the contrast between rule-
following and case-by-case choice, whether adopting more differentiated, and hence more 
complex, rules is preferable over following simpler rules is a matter of comparing, on the one 
side, the fallibility or error-proneness of imperfect, simpler rules that can be more reliably 
applied with, on the other side, the fallibility or error-proneness of imperfect agents in 
applying less imperfect, but also more complex, rules, combined with the additional costs of 
administering such rules.57 
 How receptive the two sides in the ongoing controversy will be to Kerber’s project of 
reconciliation remains to be seen. One should expect, though, that it is a much smaller step for 
advocates of the goal of economic freedom and Wettbewerbsfreiheit to concede that 
competition laws may well benefit from being more differentiated than they currently are, 
than it is for advocates of the ‘more economic approach’ to concede that the way to improve 
competition policy is not to rely on a case-by-case welfare assessment but to reform the 
general rules according to which the economic system operates. In terms of the title of this 
section, what is needed in order to reconcile the two sides is to recognize the ‘reason of rules’ 
at the sub-constitutional level of competition policy and the role that reason – or the ‘rule of 
reason’ – has to play at the constitutional level in drafting competition law. 
 
9. Conclusion 
In a recent contribution in defense of the ‘more economic approach’ Martin Hellwig (2006: 
260f.) has noted that the controversy surrounding the ‘modernization’ of EU competition 
policy has suffered from a failure to adequately distinguish between three separate questions, 
                                                                                                                                                        
interpreted as ‘most simple rules.’ As Kerber (2007: 4) recognizes: “The need for more differentiation in 
competition policy does not lead to the necessity of a case-by-case analysis of the effects of business behavior. A 
rule-based application of competition law might still be appropriate, but perhaps the development of new 
differentiated competition rules might be necessary.” 
57 Christiansen and Kerber (2006: 236): “We cannot assume that competition authorities or courts dispose of the 
knowledge base for avoiding decision errors, i.e. a certain share of decisions will be wrong … . In terms of our 
analysis, we cannot assume that the marginal benefit of additional differentiation will always be positive. It can 
even be zero or negative. … This is a logical consequence of having reached the boundaries of our general 
knowledge of competition and/or our case-specific knowledge.” 
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namely, firstly, whether certain types of behavior should be prohibited per se or be judged on 
a case-by-case basis, secondly, whether potential positive competition-effects of the 
respective behavior should be considered and, thirdly, whether in addition to its competition 
effects its potential efficiency effects should be taken into account by competition agencies. 
The purpose of the present paper has been to show that approaching the issue from the 
perspective of constitutional economics can help to sort out these and other questions that 
have been confounded in the debate. 
 The specific focus of the paper has been on the role that economists can play as 
advisors in matters of competition policy in a democratic polity. It has been argued that as an 
empirical science economics can provide advice only in the form of hypothetical imperatives, 
and that in a democratic polity the citizens are the natural ultimate addressees of such advice. 
This implies the requirement to support whatever policy advice is given by arguments that 
appeal to the citizens’ common interests, a requirement that is perfectly in line with the 
theoretical perspective of constitutional economics but that has not been recognized by 
traditional welfare economics. It has further been argued that with opting for a market 
economy, based on a private law order, a polity commits to respecting the economic freedom 
or Wettbewerbsfreiheit that is part of the private autonomy that is constitutive of such an 
order. This implies that competition policy cannot make the right of private law subjects to 
exercise such freedom contingent on how economic advisors assess the welfare effects in 
particular instances, and that welfare considerations can have their legitimate place only at the 
constitutional level where the rules of the economic game are chosen. It is at this level, but not 
at the sub-constitutional level that an ‘effects-based approach’ can help to improve 
competition policy. 
 If a clear distinction is drawn between the role that economic advice can play at the 
constitutional level by contrast to the sub-constitutional level Hellwig’s three questions find a 
straightforward answer. The answer to the first is that the inherent logic of a private law 
society as well as the ‘reason of rules’ in a complex world speak against a case-by-case 
approach and for a rule-based competition policy. The answer to the second and the third 
question is that at the constitutional level, in drafting competition law, it is a matter of 
prudence to take advantage of whatever knowledge economics can provide, in terms of 
pattern predictions, about the competition effects and efficiency effects of different kinds of 
behavior. 
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